



SAMUEL TERRY
ASSET MANAGEMENT

Australian Financial Services License number 278294

Samuel Terry Absolute Return Group (the Fund) – March 2020 quarterly report

The Fund's performance (Founder units, pre-tax, net of fees) and those of the Australian All Ordinaries Accumulation Index and the MSCI World Equities Index, are as follow:

To 31 March 2020	STAR	All Ords	MSCI (\$A)
1 quarter	-6.4%	-23.9%	-11.5%
1 year	15.0%	-15.0%	0.6%
3 years (%p.a.)	15.9%	-0.7%	8.0%
5 years (%p.a.)	23.4%	1.5%	6.8%
7 years (%p.a.)	24.2%	4.7%	12.9%
10 years (%p.a.)	23.5%	4.8%	10.1%
Since inception on 1 Nov 2003 (%p.a.)	15.6%	7.2%	7.1%

The fund's biggest loss was **Kangaroo Island Plantation Timbers** (6.3% of the Fund), which fell 54%, reducing the value of our fund by 7%. The shares fell because of fires on the island which damaged or destroyed 95% of its trees.

The future strategy of KIPT won't be known for at least several months. Its share price of \$0.91 is half of KIPT's stated net asset value of \$1.83 per share, and a modest premium to its expected net cash (post the insurance payout) of about \$0.72 per share¹.

Share markets in Australia and the world fell sharply during the quarter because of coronavirus and the associated recession. Some of our big losers were:

Australian oil hopeful **Karooon** (2.4% of the Fund) – down 61%

Australian fund manager and life insurer **AMP** (4.6% of the Fund) – down 30%

UK banks **Barclays** and **Virgin Money** - down 48% and 67% respectively

The fund generated an 11.9% gain (in total) from options on gold and the S&P index. These options were all sold during the quarter.

¹ KIPT shares were suspended from 3rd January until 30th March. For our January and February valuations, we used a KIPT share price of \$1.00, which was our internal estimate of what the shares would be trading at, if they had not been suspended from trading.

At the start of the recent slump, we had 33% of the fund in cash, some options and a further 20% of the fund in securities that are similar to cash². This enabled us to go shopping for bargains when prices fell.

We invested 4% of the fund in **Nine Entertainment**, one of Australia's leading media companies. It operates networks in print, television, radio, digital real estate classifieds, and an Australian challenger to Netflix. We bought Nine at less than breakup value and less than 10x current earnings. We think it has sufficient liquidity to survive the recession.

We invested about 4% of the fund in each of **Westpac Bank** and **National Australia Bank**. We paid less than net tangible asset value for them, which is an unusually low valuation for big Australian banks. Once the recession is over, we expect Westpac and NAB will return to earning returns on equity of over 10%.

We added to our holdings in **Barclays** and **Virgin Money** as prices fell, and bought shares in **Lloyds**, taking our total UK bank position to 4.8% of the fund. All three banks are strongly capitalised, priced at under half of net tangible asset value and very low multiples of potential earnings. While we recognise that the recession, low interest rates and Brexit are all likely to impose significant costs on UK banks, these problems will pass.

We also invested 4% of the fund in **Goldman Sachs**, one of the world's most successful banks, at a 25% discount to net tangible asset value.

We invested 4% of the fund in debt issued by **Carnival**, the world's leading cruise ship operator, at a 17% yield. Carnival's assets, mostly ships, are worth far more than the value of its debt, even after allowing for current losses. We also invested 3% of the fund in another distressed debt security.

The fund is now open to new and existing investors. We see many opportunities to invest on attractive terms, in companies both large and small, in both debt and equity. We encourage you to read the attached presentation.


The Fund's net asset value was \$189m or \$3.1195 per Founder unit and \$12.0843 per A Class unit (down 6.1%) at quarter end. 11.3% of the Fund was in cash, mostly gold. The Fund owned securities issued by 30 companies.

Fred Woollard, Nigel Burgess and Mitch Taylor
9 April 2020



<https://twitter.com/FredWoollard>

² This is mostly OneMarket and Salmat whose only material assets are cash, which is due to be distributed to shareholders in the next few months. It also includes a loan to Yellow, owner of the NZ Yellow Pages, which we expect will be repaid in a few months.



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Samuel Terry Absolute Return Group - A Class Units

April 2020



Fund Summary

Fund Name	Samuel Terry Absolute Return Group comprising Samuel Terry Absolute Return Fund and Samuel Terry Absolute Return Active Fund*
APIR Code	STP9437AU
Fund inception	November 2003
Fund Size	A\$190m
Base Currency	Australian Dollars
Investor eligibility	Wholesale investors only
Fund Liquidity	Monthly for applications and redemptions
Administrator and Custodian	Link Fund Solutions
Auditor	Grant Thornton
Management fee	1.5% plus GST p.a
Performance fee	20% of benchmark outperformance, with a high water mark, paid annually
Benchmark	RBA cash rate plus 2% p.a
Buy/Sell spread	0.5%
Platform availability	Powerwrap, Netwealth, Ausmaq

*See Appendix A for representation of legal structure



People | Small team. Experience through market cycles and across asset classes

Investment Team



Fred Woollard
Founder and Managing Director

Fred has worked in financial markets since 1981. Prior to founding Samuel Terry in 2003, Fred worked for Hunter Hall International Limited, a European family office and various stockbroking firms in Australia and the UK. Fred has an Economics degree from University of Sydney.



Nigel Burgess
Director

Nigel has worked in financial markets since 1985. Prior to joining Samuel Terry in 2009, Nigel also worked at Hunter Hall International Limited, the same European family office, Friends Provident and GIO Australia. Nigel has an Economics/Finance degree and an Accounting Masters degree, both from University of NSW.



Mitch Taylor
Portfolio Manager

Mitch has worked in financial markets since 2009. Prior to joining Samuel Terry in 2017, Mitch worked for a boutique Australian fund manager. Mitch has a Commerce degree from University of Sydney and a Master of Applied Finance from Macquarie University.

Support Team



Therese Cochrane
General Manager

Therese started work as a banking and finance and commercial lawyer in 1987. She has worked in private practice in Sydney and in-house for investment banks in London. She has an Economics degree, majoring in Accounting and Economics and a Law degree, both from University of Sydney and a Masters in Law from University of Cambridge.



Mike Conway
Business Development

Mike has worked in financial markets since 1993. Mike was a leading institutional stockbroker at UBS and Bank of America before retiring from stockbroking in 2016. Mike has relocated to Byron Bay and remains entrenched in financial markets. Mike has a business degree from UTS.




Michelle Espie
Executive Assistant

Michelle has worked in support services for over 20 years. Prior to joining Samuel Terry in 2016 she worked at Pattersons Securities, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Citigroup and Macquarie.



Performance | Good returns for 16 years

To 31 March 2020	STAR Fund* after fees	All Ords Accumulation Index	MSCI World Developed Index (AUD)
1 month	-3.5%	-20.9%	-9.3%
1 quarter	-6.4%	-23.9%	-11.5%
1 year	15.0%	-15.0%	0.6%
3 years (%p.a.)	15.9%	-0.7%	8.0%
5 years (%p.a.)	23.4%	1.5%	6.8%
7 years (%p.a.)	24.2%	4.7%	12.9%
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Since inception	15.6%	7.2%	7.1%



*Founder units – A class units have a different hurdle rate



What makes the fund different? | We have significant personal investments in the fund... we eat our own cooking



Flexible

- NOT attempting to track any index.
- Invests globally, although have a bias to Australia.
- Looks beyond equities. At times capital allocated to distressed debt and options.
- Invests across the range of market capitalisations, from Microsoft to <\$50m.
- Willing and able to invest in unlisted and illiquid securities.
- Willing and able to be active investors.



Conservative

- Often holds lots of cash. Since inception, the average cash weighting has been 18%.
- NO borrowing or leveraging of the fund.
- NO short selling
- Does not write options, will only buy them periodically.
- The majority of investments are usually in companies which themselves have net cash. This helps us sleep at night, especially when markets are slumping.



Uncomplicated

- Invests only in companies and financial instruments we understand.
- Low frequency traders. Since inception, annual portfolio turnover has been less than 50%.
- We have limited brain space and limited good ideas. Invests heavily in our best ideas. The portfolio is more concentrated than most.
- If we cannot find investments which offer attractive risk/reward, we will hold cash and wait.
- Provides a high degree of transparency.

We aim to maximise post tax returns for our Australian unit holders.



What makes the fund different? | Unique Approach. Wide opportunity set, looking for simple characteristics

"One way bets"

Heads, I win...
Tails, I don't lose...

Typically ~80% of
capital employed.

"Irrational odds"

Heads, I win \$5...
Tails, I only lose \$1...

Typically less than 20%
of capital employed.



Current Portfolio | Portfolio Snapshot at 31 March 2020

- 39% of capital invested in companies with net cash, of which 21% is in companies whose net cash exceeds their market capitalisation.
- 13% of capital is invested in corporate credit.
- 0% of capital is invested in options.
- We aim to hold securities issued by 15-30 diverse names.
- The Fund currently owns securities issued by 30 names.

Top Holdings	% of NAV
Cash (gold is 10.9% of total)	11.3%
OneMarket	8.8%
Salmat	8.6%
Kangaroo Island Plantation Timbers	6.3%
Yellow NZ	5.7%
UK Banks (Lloyds, Barclays and Virgin Money)	4.9%
Carnival Corporation 2022 bonds	4.7%
AMP	4.6%
Westpac	4.2%
Undisclosed bond	4.1%


Australian Securities	Non- Australian Securities	Cash & Gold
56.5%	32.2%	11.3%



Current Holding | Kangaroo Island Plantation Timbers – 6.3%. Market cap: \$53m

- Estate ravaged by Kangaroo Island wild-fires in January 2020. 95% of timberland fire affected.
- Unfortunate timing, the timber resource was ready for export and the company expected operations to start within 18 months.
- Significant potential profits have been lost. The share price has fallen more than 50%.
- The company is reassessing strategy to maximise the value of its assets. Significant insurance proceeds will be received in the short term.
- Kangaroo Island Plantation Timbers (KPT) still owns 26,000 Ha of highly productive agricultural land, a significant potential wharf infrastructure project, and has net cash.

KPT NTA at 31 Dec 2020. Adjusted for fires and insurance






Current Holding | OneMarket Limited – 8.8%. Market cap: \$112m

- OneMarket is a former technology business, now in liquidation. The company will return \$1.08+ in cash to shareholders in the coming months.
- Spun-out of Westfield Corporation in June 2018. For every \$100 worth of Westfield shares, holders received less than \$1 of OneMarket shares. Many holders were motivated sellers.
- We originally bought shares because they were trading for less than cash backing and a fraction of invested capital. We thought investing in the company's technology was a worthy investment with significant upside.
- The management and Board were first class, we expected they would act rationally and return cash if further investment in the technology was irrational.
- Unfortunately the technology did not work out. However, the company was liquidated with significant cash remaining.
- We will still make a profit.


OneMarket Limited share price vs net cash backing





Current Holding | Carnival Corp unsecured bonds due 2022: 4.7%. EV: USD25bln

- Carnival Corporation is the world's largest owner and operator of cruise ships. It owns 104 ships including the now infamous Diamond Princess and Ruby Princess.
- The outbreak of COVID 19 has forced the company to stop operating, cut costs and refund customer deposits. The shut-down will cost Carnival USD1bln per month. Carnival's shares have fallen 80%, and bonds more than 30%. To fund anticipated losses, the company has been forced to raise USD6.25bln in debt and equity.
- We have bought the 2022 unsecured bonds in the secondary market at **a yield above 17%**.
- Our bonds have significant asset coverage with a total LVR less than 60%. On last year's earnings, even after adjusting for this year's anticipated losses, the group's total debt is less than 4x EBITDA.
- Carnival is the largest player in a global oligopoly, has a history of consistent returns on assets, a favourable demographic exposure and pays negligible tax.
- If the situation only halts operations for 1 year and Carnival eventually returns to profitability, or if it gets worse but Carnival continues to have positive equity value – we will earn 17% for the next few years.
- If the situation gets significantly worse and cruise operators are closed for the next two years, litigation spikes or significant capital is required – we will likely be converted to equity at what we expect could be attractive prices.




Source: Bloomberg

*Samuel Terry forecast



Current Holding | Yellow Holdings NZ. Unlisted

- Yellow Holdings is an unlisted company which owns the NZ yellow pages and a suite of associated digital businesses. We own 86%.
- Sold by Telecom NZ to private equity in 2007 for more than \$2bln. Since then Yellow has been through numerous restructurings. It has consistently generated cash, at a declining rate.
- We acquired our interest between Dec 2018 and August 2019 in the secondary market. We bought from motivated sellers at attractive prices.
- Since taking control, we have restructured the Board, capital structure and management incentives. We are now in safe hands.
- Cash generation has continued. We have already been paid back more than our investment.
- The company should continue to generate cash at a declining rate. It has no material long-term liabilities.
- We are optimistic about the company's outlook despite it being part of a declining industry.





Re-opening the fund | Market conditions have changed, we are anticipating attractive investment opportunities

- For the past several years we have been vocally cautious on equity and debt securities. Despite strong demand, we limited the fund's capacity as attractive opportunities were scarce.
- The current market panic has changed this dynamic. We are more excited about the investment opportunity set than we have been for some time. We are increasingly discovering motivated sellers in both equity and debt securities.
- We are unable to predict markets and do not know whether prices will trend higher or collapse. Our observation is only that sentiment has shifted. We are raising capital to take advantage of opportunities as they appear.
- Our track record shows that we perform well out of depressed markets and can generate good returns in both large and small securities. We have confidence that we can continue to generate good returns with larger funds under management.
- It is in the interest of all unit holders for us to only grow in accordance with the available opportunity set. We will close the fund when it reaches a level where we are no longer confident in our ability to generate good returns.



Re-opening the fund | Capital is scarce, bargains may present themselves in the current environment

"We expect drawdowns of up to \$65bln, exceeding cash reserves which may potentially force funds to engage in a fire sale of assets to cover payouts" - Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, April 2020



We believe up to 30% of US companies will require new capital in the next 12 months" - Goldman Sachs, April 2020.



Seeing so many companies provide negative earnings guidance so soon after the February reporting season reflects how quickly operating conditions have deteriorated in such a short space of time... Given the surge in guidance withdrawals did not start until March 19, we may see more equity raisings" - Macquarie Securities, March 2020.



Junk Bond Funds suffer the worst outflows in years" - Financial Times, March 2020






Re-opening the fund | Small companies are relatively cheap, and many require capital

ASX Emerging Companies Index ratio to ASX 50 Index





Re-opening the Fund | Panics are not new, leverage periodically facilitates forced selling



We do not know whether the general market will increase or decrease. Nor do we know how deep the COVID 19 global recession will be. However, we believe we will get to the other side, and that there may be attractive investment opportunities in the interim.



Reasons NOT to invest | Our fund is not for everyone

1. The Fund has a more concentrated portfolio than most other funds.
2. Although performance in recent years has been favourable, the Fund has had periods of poor performance, and will do so again.
3. Illiquid and/or obscure securities comprise part of the Fund's portfolio. If you want to invest only in well-known, blue-chip securities, this Fund is not for you.
4. The Fund's illiquid securities could be difficult to sell quickly if the Fund receives a large number of redemption requests at once.
5. At times, a small proportion of the Fund will be invested in speculative securities. Some of these will pay off. Others will become worthless, as some have done.
6. The Fund is managed with the objective of maximizing after-tax returns for Australian residents, rather than maximizing pre-tax returns.
7. The Fund has been designed to be unsuitable for investors seeking a short-term home for their money.
8. The Fund is unlikely to pay a regular income.
9. Most of the Fund's portfolio will usually be risk-averse and defensive; but in times of panic you should expect the Fund to be an aggressive buyer of more speculative securities if their prices fall to levels judged to be ridiculously cheap. Some people do not feel comfortable with this approach, even though it generated good returns for the Fund following the panic of 2008-2009.




Reasons **NOT** to invest | Our fees are higher than those of many other funds, especially index funds



Management Fee

- 1.5% p.a.



Performance Fee

- 20% above the RBA Cash Rate + 2% pa, with a high-water mark



Still interested?

Feel free to contact us to hear more.

Samuel Terry Asset Management Pty Ltd
120B Underwood Street
Paddington NSW 2021
AUSTRALIA

PO Box R1743
Royal Exchange NSW 1225
AUSTRALIA

Fred Woollard
Founder and Managing Director of Samuel Terry Asset Management
M: 0400 001976
E: fred@samuelterry.com.au

www.samuelterry.com.au




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Appendix A – Fund structure

In 2019 Samuel Terry Absolute Return Active Fund (STAR Active) was established to acquire STAR Fund's interest in an operating business (Yellow NZ). This was done in an effort to maximise after tax returns to Australian Unit holders. Unit holders resolved to staple STAR Active to STAR Fund. Stapling in this way is quite common in the market.



STAM receives management and performance fees based on the aggregate net assets of both trusts.



Disclaimer

Samuel Terry Asset Management Pty Limited (AFSL 278294) does not guarantee the repayment of capital or any particular rate of return from the Trust. Past performance is no guarantee or indication of future performance. The unit price can go down as well as up. Investment returns have been calculated in accordance with normal industry practice utilising movements in the unit price and assuming reinvestment of all distribution of income and realized profits. The presentation does not take into account a reader's investment objectives, particular needs or financial situation. It is general information only and should not be considered as investment advice and should not be relied on as an investment recommendation.

We cannot and are not providing tax advice, and encourage you to seek independent tax advice before investing.

STAM may pass on part of its management and performance fees to financial advisers and other third parties that introduce investors to the Fund.